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Abstract—Today, companies are required to be in control
of their IT assets, and to provide proof of this in the form
of independent IT audit reports. However, many companies
have outsourced various parts of their IT systems to other
companies, which potentially threatens the control they have
of their IT assets. To provide proof of being in control of
outsourced IT systems, the outsourcing client and outsourcing
provider need a written service level agreement (SLA) that can
be audited by an independent party.
SLAs for availability and response time are common practice
in business, but so far there is no practical method for
specifying confidentiality requirements in an SLA. Specifying
confidentiality requirements is hard because in contrast to
availability and response time, confidentiality incidents cannot
be monitored: attackers who breach confidentiality try to do
this unobserved by both client and provider. In addition,
providers usually do not want to reveal their own infrastructure
to the client for monitoring or risk assessment.
Elsewhere, we have presented an architecture-based method
for confidentiality risk assessment in IT outsourcing. In this
paper, we adapt this method to confidentiality requirements
specification, and present a case study to evaluate this new
method.
Keywords-Confidentiality requirements; Outsourcing, Ser-
vice level agreements; Risk assessment
I. INTRODUCTION
Current regulations such as Basel II [2], SOX [23], ISO-
17799 [13], BDSG 42a [4], and the California Database
Breach Act [6], require companies to be in control of
the security of their IT assets and to provide proof of
this in the form of audit reports. In this paper we call
this the control requirement and by implication the more
detailed IT requirements derived from this are also control
requirements. Satisfying control requirements is perceived
as not contributing to the company’s products or services.
Therefore, companies are always aiming at satisfying control
requirements in the most cost-effective way.
Satisfaction of control requirements is further complicated
because organizations outsource tasks that are not part of
their core business, such as IT management, by which some
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of their IT is now actually under the control of other orga-
nizations. In this paper, we introduce and evaluate a method
for identifying and specifying a particularly important con-
trol requirement in outsourcing, namely confidentiality of
information.
IT outsourcing requires connecting IT infrastructures of
two organizations, and mutually giving access to this cross-
organizational infrastructure. For example, some employees
of the provider must be able to perform management ser-
vices on the IT infrastructure of the client, and conversely
some employees of the client must be able to grant or
revoke permissions to the employees of the provider. In
whatever way this is done, security risks arise that must be
managed jointly [8]. Assessing the security risks of either
organization requires knowledge of both organizations’ IT
infrastructure, and mitigation measures also often require
actions in both infrastructures [11], [16]. However, this is
challenging, because outsourcing providers are commonly
large organizations that provide IT services to several cus-
tomers and the security requirements of these customers
deviate from each other. Furthermore, to maintain security
and protect business secrets, and to satisfy their own control
requirements, providers do not want to reveal more about
their IT infrastructure than strictly necessary.
Providers usually show that they are trustworthy by show-
ing compliance to regulations such as SOX [23] etc. and
additionally by independent audits, who produce a report
under Statement of Auditing Standards No. 70 Service
Organizations (SAS 70). A client who thinks that these
compliance reports alone are not enough, should additionally
specify the content of the audits in the form of Service
Level Agreements (SLAs) that define service-specific re-
quirements.
An SLA is a mid- to long-term contract that specifies ser-
vice quality levels for the outsourcing provider, and fines for
failing to deliver these. SLAs usually specify quality levels
for availability and response time, but so far in practice they
do not specify quality levels for confidentiality. Yet today,
outsourcing clients have to show that they satisfy the control
requirement of treating their data confidentially, and so they
now need to specify their confidentiality requirements in
SLAs.
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Figure 1. Structure of this research. The top-level problem is shown on the left.
The problem with specifying confidentiality requirements
in an SLA is that clients do not want to specify a quantified
confidentiality level such as that on the average at most
1% of the data should be lost per month. Furthermore,
even if they would want to specify a confidentiality level
like this, this attribute could not be monitored because
typically, confidentiality incidents are not observable by
the client, both because attackers keep their actions secret
and because the provider would not allow any client to
monitor the provider’s IT infrastructure. So another approach
to confidentiality level specification must be chosen, that
satisfies at least three criteria that we have identified so far:
(C1) it does not specify confidentiality levels as percentages
of data loss; (C2) it is not based on monitoring incidents; and
(C3) it does not require a provider to disclose confidential
information.
Companies currently have checklists of confidentiality
risks that they use to assess the risks of an outsourcing
architecture. These checklists do not explicitly consider
confidentiality, and they also do not provide sufficient in-
sights in confidentiality risks to support negotiation with
the outsourcing provider. Discussion with several companies
taught us that the method should satisfy several criteria
additional to the ones we mention above:
C4 The method should be usable with acceptable effort
for the client. In particular, experienced risk assessors
should be able to use it without following a course
and it should not increase the time allowed for risk
assessment. We call this criterion ease of use.
C5 The method should deliver results (confidentiality con-
trol requirements to be included in an SLA) that are
independent of personal judgment by making less use
of subjective estimates than the checklist based method.
We call this criterion repeatability.
C6 The method should increase the client’s understanding
of confidentiality risks in this outsourcing relationship.
In this paper we propose and evaluate a method that
meets these requirements sufficiently in the cases that we
have investigated, and in a way that justifies the claim that
it will meet these criteria in other cases too. It is based
on specifying confidentiality requirements according to risk
assessment results.
II. RESEARCH METHOD AND STRUCTURE OF THE PAPER
In this paper we follow a nested problem-solving ap-
proach as proposed earlier by Wieringa [25] (Figure 1). At
the top level we have the practical problem of specifying
confidentiality control requirements of an outsourcing client
in an SLA. A practical problem is a difference between
the real world and the way stakeholders would like it to
be. To resolve it, some change must be applied to the real
world. In this paper we call this change a treatment.1 In
a rational problem solving cycle, the treatment is designed
after an investigation of the problem and validated before
implementation; and it is evaluated after implementation.
We have already presented our problem investigation in
Section I. We will describe existing solutions in Section IX.
In Section III we describe our treatment, which is an
extension of the CRAC method [17] for assessing and com-
paring the confidentiality risks of IT architectures, by a step
that specifies requirements for confidentiality risk mitigation
measures. We call this extended method CRAC++.
Sections IV to VII describe a validation of CRAC++. This
is the main topic of this paper.
The question whether a treatment is valid asks whether the
treatment will have the desired effects. This is a research
1Earlier we called it a solution [24] but this hides the fact that a treatment
may not solve the problem completely but only bring the stakeholders closer
to their goals, or may even make the problem worse, as when a doctor
prescribes a wrong medicine.
question. To answer a research question, we have to do
something, and this is a new practical problem at a lower
level of nesting (Figure 1, middle column). Standard treat-
ment validation questions are what the effects of a treatment
will be, and whether this will satisfy stakeholders’ criteria
(RQ1), how this compares to alternative treatments (RQ2)
and whether this will work in other problem contexts too
(RQ3). The middle column of Figure 1 shows a rational
problem solving cycle in which the researcher investigates
the research problem, designs research to answer the re-
search questions, validates the research design, executes it
and analyzes the results.
To validate a method, we eventually need a realistic
context in which the method is applied. Applying it to a toy
problem is fine for illustration, and testing in an experiment
is good for improving our understanding of the method,
but in order to know whether the method will work in
practice, it has to be used in practice. This could be done
by a field experiment, in which practitioners use the method
to solve an experimental problem [22]. This is extremely
expensive but not impossible. In our case, we opted for the
more realistic option, given our budget, of using the method
ourselves for a real world problem. In other words, we took
an action research approach to validation [3].
We have acquired a case organization that needed to
specify confidentiality requirements in an outsourcing re-
lation (Section IV), and have used CRAC++ to specify
confidentiality requirements that could be included in an
outsourcing SLA (Section V). Analysis of this case allows
us to find a first, approximate answer RQ1 (Section VII-A).
Analyzing the mechanisms at work during our application
of CRAC++ allows us also to assess generalizability (RQ3,
(Section VII-C)), and comparison with what would happen
when using other methods allows us to assess trade-offs with
other treatments (RQ2, (Section VII-B)).
The validity of our action research approach is the inverse
of the risk that we are giving the wrong answers to our
research questions. We discuss this risk in Section VIII.
III. CRAC++
The Confidentiality Risk Assessment and Comparison
(CRAC) method [17] compares confidentiality risks of two
alternative networked IT architectures by analyzing how in-
formation can flow through a network, and how unauthorized
persons can move (get access to nodes) through the network.
Possible information flow determines the information that
can be present in a node of the network, and therefore allows
us to assess the cost of a confidentiality breach (information
disclosure) at that node. Analysis of possible movement of
unauthorized persons through the network allows us to asses
the risk of an unauthorized person accessing a node, causing
a confidentiality breach. Combining this information allows
us to assess the risk of confidentiality breach per node.
In CRAC++, we extend this method with a step to identify
confidentiality requirements of the client that are not implied
by the known confidentiality requirements of the provider,
and which therefore are candidates for inclusion in an SLA
with that provider.
Step 0: Elicit Input Data
Relevant documents to consider are IT architecture spec-
ifications, existing SLAs, best practices, relevant recom-
mendations, standards and laws that contain confidentiality
control requirements, the NIST vulnerability list [18], etc.
Relevant stakeholders may include the company’s security
officer, system architect, and security architect.
At the end of this step the risk assessor has the following
data, which is used in the following steps of the method:
Information assets: Functional or organizational data
stored on the system components, and of value to the orga-
nization, such as user credentials, client data and functional
specifications of the system. We classify these information
assets based on their confidentiality-relevant properties, such
as confidentiality value for the organization. Information
assets are types that have instances. For example, if client
data is an information asset, then each client record is an
instance of this asset.
Threat agents: These are potential attackers, e.g. hack-
ers, or people who may intentionally or accidentally access
information assets that they are not authorized to access,
such as malicious insiders or outsourcing providers. We
classify threat agents based on their estimated capabilities,
such as system knowledge and hacking skills.
IT architectural components: These can be hardware
(servers, terminals, routers, USB-sticks, a physical location
(e.g. buildings), software (applications, operating systems,
firewalls, etc.), or a network location (e.g. a network seg-
ment).
Relevant vulnerabilities: A vulnerability is a condition
of the IT infrastructure or its organization that facilitates
confidentiality attacks on architectural components. For in-
stance if “reuse of storage media without proper erasure”
is a vulnerability a threat agent may exploit to access
information stored on an external hard disk. Furthermore,
we call vulnerabilities that need to be mitigated according
to the confidentiality requirements of the outsourcing client
relevant vulnerabilities.
Confidentiality requirements: We make lists of both the
confidentiality requirements of the outsourcing client and
those of the outsourcing provider.
Step 1: Assessing Total Impact of Disclosure per Component
First, for each information asset and each component that
the asset can reside on, we make an Information Flow
Graph (IFG) that shows how this information can flow
through the network (Figure 2-(a)). An IFG is a directed
and rooted graph that represents flow of instances of an
information asset from one information source, such as a
database. Each node represents an architectural component.
The combination of IFGs tells us which information can be
present in an architectural component.
We determine the IFGs with security experts of the target
of assessment by analyzing desired or undesired retrieval of
instances of each information asset over physical and logical
connections between components. For instance if the IFG
represents the flow of client data, a client record could flow
from the client database over the network to the terminal
PC. Note that there are components, such as a router, that
have no value because no instance can be stored on them.
C4C3
C7
C5
C1
C8
C11
C2
C6
C10
C9
m
m
C3
C12
m
h
C1
C7
h
C11
(a) (b)
Figure 2. (a) Information Flow Graph; (b) Attack Propagation Graph
Next, for each component, security experts assess the total
value of information on the component. We call this value
total impact, because it indicates the impact of disclosing
information on a component. In the real-world cases that
we have done so far, it is not known by the security experts
what the monetary value of each information asset of the
company is. Security experts prefer to assess the value in
terms of ordered non-ratio values such as very high – high
– medium – low – very low. Therefore, in each real-world
case, together with the security experts we have defined a
qualitative summation operator that allows us to “add up” the
value of the information that can be in the component, which
is therefore the estimation, by security experts, of the total
impact of information disclosure per component. Since we
do not have a ratio scale of information value, this “addition”
is not a summation operator but a way of expressing the
opinion of security experts about the combined value of all
information that can reside on a component.
At the end of this step we identify the confidentiality-
critical components. We call those components for which
unauthorized access would create the highest total impact
confidentiality-critical components.
Step 2: Assessing Protection Level per Component
Having assessed the total impact of information per com-
ponent, we must now assess the likelihood that a component
will be accessed by an unauthorized agent. Frequencies
of access by unauthorized agents are not available, so we
cannot assess this likelihood numerically. Instead, we will
assess, with the security experts, the protection level of each
component for each class of threat agent and will use this to
estimate the risk of information disclosure per component.
Ease of exploiting vulnerabilities: For this we first, with
security experts, assess for each threat agent the ease of
exploiting vulnerabilities, based on the agent’s capabilities.
This assessment only depends on an assessment of the
agent’s capabilities and of vulnerabilities, and does not
require knowledge of the IT architecture. We express ease
of exploiting vulnerabilities in an ordered scale of fractions
between 0 and 1, such as 2/3. The absolute numerical value
of these fractions has no meaning, but their relative ordering
expresses the security experts’ opinion about which exploit
is usually more difficult for a threat agent. We assume here
that these opinions can be totally ordered.
Ease of accessing one component: Together with se-
curity experts we assess the vulnerabilities of each com-
ponent, and the effectiveness of any preventive measures
taken for these vulnerabilities per component. This is then
combined with the previous analysis of ease of exploiting
vulnerabilities by a threat agent. This provides us with an
assessment, by the security experts, of the ease of accessing
a component for each threat agent. Again, the ease is
qualitatively expressed in terms of a totally ordered set of
values.
Protection level of component in network: If there were
only one component in the network we would be done after
assessing the ease of accessing components. However, each
component is part of the architecture and an attacker can
take many paths through the network. To analyze the effect
of this on each component, for each threat agent we make
an attack propagation graph (APG) that represents all paths
the attacker can take to a valuable node. An APG is a
finite directed graph with one or more terminal nodes (nodes
without outgoing edges). The nodes represent components
of the system and the edges represent attack steps (Figure 2-
(b)). The edges are annotated with the ease of this step for
the attacker.
We construct an APG by first drawing nodes representing
the entry points of the system and then gradually connecting
further components by considering all possible propagations,
until we reach a component that contains all instances of an
information asset. These are the terminal nodes, because we
assume that the threat agent will be satisfied when he reaches
these nodes, either because this was his goal or because he
is pleasantly surprised by what he finds there.
For each path from an entry node to a terminal node,
we define the bottleneck of the path as the node that is
hardest to access for the threat agent. The bottleneck may
cause the threat agent to stop pursuing this path. For each
terminal node t, we then select the path with the easiest
bottleneck. The ease of access of this bottleneck is then by
definition the protection level of t against this threat agent.
Finally, for all APGs in which t is a terminal node, we
define the easiest bottleneck as the protection level of t.
Components with low protection levels need attention. In
particular, the outsourcing client may want to require the
provider to increase the protection level of this component.
Step 3: Determining Candidate Confidentiality Requirements
In this step we identify confidentiality requirements of the
client that are not implied by known confidentiality require-
ments of the provider. Those identified requirements that
affect the ease of exploiting vulnerabilities of confidentiality-
critical components are candidate requirements to be in-
cluded in an SLA.
First, we identify vulnerabilities against which the client
wants to defend itself. For this we identify the outsourcing
client’s confidentiality requirements that are not implied
by known confidentiality requirements of the provider. We
assume that the related vulnerabilities are not mitigated
by measures of the provider and call these unmitigated
vulnerabilities.
In Step 2 we have identified protection levels under the
assumption that the clients confidentiality requirements were
satisfied. Now, we have two scenarios: Either the client asks
the provider to step up its own confidentiality requirements
so that all of the unmitigated vulnerabilities will be mitigated
sufficiently (best case), or we do nothing (worst case). Step 2
has already been done for the best case, so now we redo it
for the worst case.
Finally, the security experts compare the protection levels
of critical components in the best and worst cases and
identify the confidentiality requirements that the provider
should satisfy. These could be all of the requirements needed
to realize the best case. More realistically, the security
experts have to deal with finite budgets, and it is not possible
to realize the best case. Each additional requirement in the
SLAs will increase the cost of outsourcing, and from this
point on, confidentiality requirements specification will be
a negotiation between client and provider. CRAC++ has
provided the information security officer of the client with
sufficient architectural information to conduct these negoti-
ations, namely by allowing him to reason about what would
happen if a requirement is included or dropped from the
SLA. CRAC++ is therefore a method to support decisions
about confidentiality requirements.
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IV. THE CASE: PROBLEM INVESTIGATION
A. Stakeholders
The case to be described is a large multinational industrial
company, which we refer to as X, with a total of 23,500
employees and divisions in 49 countries. Figure 3 shows
the outsourcing relation that we will consider.
CIT is a competency center of X responsible for providing
information and communication services to the system units.
The security requirements of these services are defined in a
corporate master agreement (CMA) and if necessary detailed
by Service Agreements (SA). The CMA contains control
objectives that are extracted from the corporate rules. A
control objective is a measure that indicates fulfillment of a
control requirement. For example, the control requirement
“The organization’s approach to managing information
security and its implementation should be reviewed
independently at planned intervals ...”
is operationalized in the SA by the control objective
“CIT shall provide yearly a compliance statement ...
declaring compliancy to corporate regulations on infor-
mation security of service providing as contracted. ...”
The Managing Board of X is responsible for managing and
protecting the benefits of all competency centers. Compe-
tency center managers report yearly to the Managing Board
on the fulfillment of the requirements in the CMA.
One set of services provided by CIT to users in X
is Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP). Furthermore, CIT
has outsourced ERP data center hosting services to an
outsourcing provider. An Outsourcing Master Agreement
(OMA) describes the quality attributes of the services that
the outsourcing provider delivers to CIT and an SLA details
the case specific requirements. There is one rule in the OMA
that describes the confidentiality-related quality attributes:
“In protecting Confidential Information, [Provider] will
take all necessary precautions and the confidential infor-
mation will be treated in the same manner and with the
same degree of care as [Provider] applies with respect to
its own confidential information. [Provider] shall keep
all Confidential Information disclosed to it by X and
[further clients of the Provider] in secure places, under
strict access and use restrictions.”
The current SLA between the outsourcing provider and
client contains no confidentiality requirements.
B. IT architecture
The ERP system and the hardware that it runs on are
owned by CIT but most of it is located in data centers owned
by the provider. The ERP database contains four business
confidential information assets:
• Application information is the business-related infor-
mation of X, e.g. customer records and product prices.
• Functional information is monitoring-related informa-
tion, e.g. access logs and IDS rule set.
• User information is information on the system users,
e.g. roles and credentials.
• Technical information is the IT infrastructure-related
information of the service, e.g. tunnelling data, of the
ERP environment.
Figure 4 shows the architecture of the outsourcing IT in-
frastructure. Components with the same functionality that
are located in the same network segment, e.g. employee PC
(CPC), are represented by a single symbol. The firewalls
between network segments provide IP-based access control.
The gray rectangles represent physical buildings owned by
the provider or by X.
C. Stakeholder Goals
Table I summarizes the stakeholder goals, and obstacles
to goal achievement. (Our use of goals and obstacles is
similar to KAOS [7].) Our aim is to find the confidentiality
requirements that will help X to mitigate the effect of these
obstacles.
As a response to recent changes in governance require-
ments, the Managing Board aims to be compliant with
Corporate Governance Code (G1). One consequence of this
is that corporate units such as CIT have become responsible
for the quality of the services that they deliver to users in
the company. To audit this, the Managing Board requires
the corporate unit managers to periodically present reports
on the quality of the services that they deliver to the System
Users. However, the outsourcing provider does not allow
CIT to directly analyze the confidentiality properties of the
ERP system. The provider periodically delivers third-party
Local Area Network
Local Area Network
Service Network
...
Global Network
ERP Managemen
 Application ERP client applications
...
Provider Data center
X
Provider building
Router
User PCs
Service
manager PCs
ERP Manage-
ment server
Oracle database
management system
ERP system 
servers
... ...
Internet
FW
FW
FW
Cleint building
Figure 4. The IT infrastructure that supports the services in the scope of
the case study.
audit reports based on their own security requirements to
CIT (O1). This is an obstacle to G1 because these audit
reports do not reflect the confidentiality requirements of X
but of the provider.
CIT aims to deliver the system users ERP services that
are compliant with the corporate requirements of X (G2).
However, the OMA and the SLA that specifies the ERP
Data Center Hosting Service originate from a period before
the new Governance Code, and therefore they do not cover
the confidentiality requirements that follow from this code
(O2).
The provider aims to deliver ERP Data Center Hosting
Services as specified in the OMA and SLA and convince X
that his security baselines satisfy the security requirements
of X (G3); but also to remain compliant with SOX [23] and
SAS70 [1] (G4).
The provider has difficulty keeping track of the technical
changes related to delivered services and changing confiden-
tiality requirements of its customers (O3). The provider says
that this is because the outsourcing clients are not commu-
nicating their confidentiality requirements clearly (O4).
V. THE CASE: APPLYING CRAC++
Together with company X, we made a plan for applying
CRAC++ and validated the plan with the decision makers
to check whether this would help them reach their goals
Table I
CONFIDENTIALITY GOALS AND PROBLEMS.
Stakeholders Goals Obstacles
Managing
board
(G1) To be compliant with Corporate Governance Code. (O1) The provider does not give direct insight into confidentiality
of its systems to X.
CIT (G2) To deliver user units of X CIT services that are compliant
with CIT security requirements.
(O2) The SLAs and the OMAs do not contain confidentiality
indicators, therefore it cannot be measured how well systems of
the outsourcing provider meet the confidentiality requirements of
the X.
Outsourcing
provider
(G3) To deliver ERP Data Center Hosting Services as specified
in the OMA and SLA and convince X that the confidentiality
level of the services they deliver is enough for the requirements
of X.
(G4) To remain compliant with SOX [23] and SAS70 [1].
(O3) Confidentiality requirements are changing dynamically.
(O4) Outsourcing clients are not communicating their confiden-
tiality requirements clearly
(treatment design and validation in the lowest-level cycle of
Figure 1). After obtaining approval, we executed the plan.
Here, we briefly report on the results.
Step 0: Eliciting Input Data
At the end of this step we obtained the following infor-
mation:
• a list of information assets (Application Information,
Functional Information, User Information, and Tech-
nical Information) and their confidentiality levels in a
range of low to high;
• a list of components of the IT infrastructure of the
system (basically, Figure 4);
• a list of confidentiality requirements and control ob-
jectives of the outsourcing client and a list of control
objectives of the outsourcing provider;
• a list of known relevant vulnerabilities (Some of these
vulnerabilities are Unprotected Communication Lines,
Possibility To Access The Applications Remotely,
Weak Authentication and Inadequate Patch Manage-
ment Process); and
• a classification of possible threat agents (Insider, Mali-
cious Insider, Outsourcer, Subcontractor, and Outsider)
and a classification of their competencies (Physical Ac-
cess, System Knowledge, Technical Knowledge, Social
Knowledge, Social Hacking Skills, Hacking Skills, and
Motivation To Damage).
Step 1: Aggregating Total Impact
We produced four IFGs, one for each information asset,
and the total information disclosure impacts of components
composing them. For instance, the ORACLE Server com-
ponent is in the IFGs modeling the flow of Application
Information (with confidentiality level high), Functional In-
formation (with confidentiality level low), User Information
(with confidentiality level high) and Technical Information
(with confidentiality level low). We determine that the total
impact of ORACLE Server as very high by aggregating the
confidentiality values of instances of these information assets
that are stored on ORACLE Server.
All in all, we identify that 27% of the components
have very high total impact, 20% of the components have
high total impact, 7% of the components have low total
impact and the of the components have null impact. This
provided us with sufficient information to determine the
critical components in Step 4.
Step 2: Assessing Protection Levels
We constructed five APGs, one for each threat agent, and
assessed the protection levels of components that comprise
them. For instance the component ORACLE Server is in
the APG for Insider, Malicious Insider, Outsourcer, and Sub-
contractor with the following protection levels 1/6, 1/2, 4/9
and 1/15. Consequently we define the protection level of
ORACLE server as 1/2, which indicates the easiest exploit.
Step 3: Determining Candidate Confidentiality Requirements
In our case we did not have access to the list of confiden-
tiality requirements of the provider but we did have access
to his control objectives, which operationalize providers
confidentiality requirements. We therefore first specified
the control objectives of the client that are related with
his confidentiality requirements. Then we checked which
of these were not implied by control objectives of the
provider. There were nine of those. We then assessed the
protection levels for the critical components mentioned in
these objectives in the worst case and found that 20% of
the critical components are affected by at least one of those
nine objectives. Vulnerabilities of these critical components
can be mitigated by adding control objectives that mitigate
these vulnerabilities to the SLA.
For example, the requirement of X “Removal of Property”
is operationalized by the control objective
“All items of equipment containing storage media
should be checked to ensure that any sensitive data
and licensed software has been removed or securely
overwritten prior to disposal.”
This is not implied by any control objective of the provider
and so “Use of removable media is allowed” is one of the
unmitigated vulnerabilities. It can be exploited by a threat
agent to access the component ORACLE Server. According
to the worst case scenario we determined that the protection
level of ORACLE Server is 9/18. In the best case the
protection level of ORACLE Server is 8/18. The outsourcing
client may now use this information as an argument to
include “Removal of Property” in the SLA.
VI. EVALUATION OF STAKEHOLDER GOAL
ACHIEVEMENT
Evaluation of achievement of stakeholder goals with the
security officer of X and a representative of the outsourcing
provider led to the following conclusions.
G1: By applying CRAC++, the necessary control re-
quirements can be included in the SLAs. Consequently the
audit reports of CIT to Management can improve their
compliance to Corporate Governance Code.
G2: Including in the SLA confidentiality requirements
that are currently not satisfied by the provider allows CIT to
provide services to units of X that comply with CIT security
requirements.
G3: The provider cannot be held accountable for
requirements not stated in the OMA and SLA, which takes
away O3. Furthermore, since the necessary control require-
ments are a part of the new SLA, the provider is able to
convince X that the confidentiality level of the services he
delivers satisfies the requirements of X, which also takes
away O4.
G4: CRAC++ does not require the provider to disclose
any confidential information to the risk assessor or to X, that
he is not currently sharing. In return for this, the provider
must implement further confidentiality controls as specified
in the new SLA; these do not negatively affect the provider’s
compliance to SOX or SAS70.
VII. ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
A. RQ1: Does CRAC++ satisfy the criteria?
(C1) Confidentiality level specified as percentage of
data disclosure: In Step 1, CRAC++ uses an estimation of
the relative cost of disclosure of instances of information as-
sets to determine the impact and total impact of components.
We use this in Step 4 to determine critical components, not
to define levels of “acceptable” percentages of information
disclosure. Therefore, CRAC++ satisfies C1.
(C2) Incident monitoring: CRAC++ does not depend
on monitoring incidents but on domain-specific knowledge
of security experts of the capabilities of threat agents and
the presence of vulnerabilities in components.
(C3) Not disclosing confidential system information: To
identify the vulnerabilities of components and compare pro-
tection levels in best and worst cases, only shared knowledge
about the architecture of the IT infrastructure of outsourcing
provider is used.
(C4) Ease of use: In the field study the first author
needed one week to understand X’s problem (lowest level
problem investigation in Figure 1) and conduct Step 0 of
CRAC++, and one additional week for executing the other
steps. X has so far no experience with confidentiality risk
assessments, but it is not uncommon for checklist based
security risk assessments to take two weeks. Also, the steps
and results were easily understood by the security experts.
This does not show that the method is easy to use, but
neither does it give evidence that the method is more difficult
to use than the checklist approach. To evaluate satisfaction
of C4, a systematic usability study should be done.
(C5) Repeatability: One way to show repeatability of
a method is to have several subjects use it on the same
case, using the same information, and checking whether
the method gives the same result. We did not have the
resources to do this and instead estimated the repeatability
of the method by counting the number of concepts that
require subjective estimation, that are likely to be different
for different users. All in all, the metamodel of CRAC++
contains 21 concepts, of which 18, such as “component”
or “threat agent” can be observed objectively, or at least
in a way so that all stakeholders agree. A few, such as
protection level, are subjective. All alternative methods that
we considered (such as the in-house checklist-based method)
has metamodels containing more subjective concepts. We
consider this an indication that the method is less subjective
than alternative methods. Space limitations prevent us from
reporting this in detail.
(C6) Increased understanding: After applying
CRAC++ to the case CIT reported increased understanding
of the effects of confidentiality requirements on the risk
levels of the components and was able to prioritize them
according to the impact of incidents.
B. RQ2: How does CRAC++ compare to alternative treat-
ments?
As an alternative treatment to achieving G2, X suggested
to monitor the outsourced IT systems with a Security Inci-
dent and Event Monitoring (SIEM) tool. However, SIEM
tools generate logs with confidential data and possibly
increases the criticality of components, so they increase the
confidentiality risks for X. And they also would require the
provider to disclose confidential information, which violates
C2.
As another alternative treatment to achieve G2, X exe-
cuted a third party audit based on the control objectives
of CIT. However, this treatment did not succeed either.
Although the audit report indicated some incompliance,
X did not have a mechanism to enforce the provider to
implement measures. Furthermore, the control objectives
of X were not linked to risks. So, X also did not have
an identification of how to mitigate the risk by applying
measures on the part of the system that he has control over.
In [17] we compare the subjectivity of CRAC to that
of other risk assessment methods. There, we showed that
the CRAC method is more repeatable than CRAMM [5]
and checklist-based risk assessment. For instance, if the risk
assessment would be conducted with the CRAMM-method,
then in total 76% of the variables would be non-subjective.
So we conclude that CRAC++ is more repeatable than
assessing confidentiality risks with CRAMM and specifying
control objectives as we described in Step 3 of CRAC++.
C. RQ3: In which contexts is CRAC++ usable?
CRAC++ makes a number of assumptions about its con-
text of use. These assumptions govern its reusability in
different contexts. We assume (A1) that the provider does
have confidentiality control objects and that the provider
satisfies these—the CRAC++ method does not contain a step
to check this. Furthermore, CRAC++ does not assume that
the provider discloses confidential information or that the
client has quantified the value of information assets or the
likelihood of unauthorized access per component. By impli-
cation, (A2) we do assume that there are security experts
that have informed opinions about this, and the method then
helps in drawing conclusions from these opinions.
Large outsourcing providers are subject to control require-
ments and will satisfy A1. Large outsourcing clients with a
security staff and chief security officer will satisfy A2.
So far, we have applied CRAC++ twice, both in multi-
national industrial companies where confidentiality was not
a critical requirement until external regulators enforced it.
Operating in highly competitive markets, these companies
are very cost-sensitive and they will therefore not aim
at maximum confidentiality. This might well be different
in privacy-sensitive organizations such as health care or
insurance companies, or in high security organizations such
as the military. We do point out though that the qualitative
assessments in CRAC++ could be replaced by more quan-
titatively informed techniques without changing the overall
logic of the method. Nevertheless, as a third assumption
for use we hypothesize that (A3) in the context of use,
confidentiality is not the highest-priority requirement.
All of this indicates reusability to any context that satisfies
the three assumptions.
VIII. THREATS TO VALIDITY
In the previous section we proposed answers to three
questions relevant to the validation of CRAC++. Now we
must consider the validity of these answers themselves:
What is the likelihood that we answered the questions
incorrectly? The higher this likelihood is, the lower the
validity of our answers.
Answering RQ1, we found that CRAC++ satisfies C1, C2,
C3, and C6; analyzing the reasons for these answers we find
no reasoning errors or observational mistakes so we claim
these answers are valid. C4 could not really be checked,
since the user of the method (Morali) is also the inventor of
the method. More systematic usability studies would require
tool support, which currently is absent.
Repeatability (C5) has been checked indirectly by count-
ing the number of subjective concepts. This is not a sure in-
dicator of repeatability, and experimental research is needed
to validate the repeatability of the method.
CIT reported increased understanding (C6), but we did
not apply a formal test (e.g. an exam) to test this, nor did
we analyze to which extent this is due to CRAC++.
The comparison with other approaches (RQ2) does not
introduce new threats to validity that we can think of.
We answered the reusability question (RQ3) by identi-
fying the conditions under which CRAC++ can be used,
and actually showing that it could be used in another case
satisfying these assumptions. Like all inductive conclusions,
our conclusion that CRAC++ can be used in other cases is
uncertain, but because we used analytic reasoning rather than
statistical reasoning, we cannot quantify this uncertainty. In
any case, our generalization claim should be subjected to
further tests by applying CRAC++ to other cases that satisfy
the assumptions.
IX. RELATED WORK
Several methods have been proposed for managing se-
curity when outsourcing IT management [12], [15], [19],
[21]. Data Protection Agreement (DPA) [20] specifies what
a provider may and may not do with the client’s data.
CRAC++ can be used to identify relevant confidentiality
requirements for a DPA. Insurance Contracts (IC) [8] defines
security requirements based on past incidents, which, for
confidentiality, is not realistic. Protection Level Agreement
(PLA) [14] specifies metrics to define protection levels. This
can be used in combination with CRAC++.
Haley et al. [10] define a method for defining security
requirements as constraints on functional requirements. This
differs from CRAC++ because we ignore functional re-
quirements. Rather, we define confidentiality requirements
that serve the control objectives imposed by regulators. We
do make explicit trust assumptions as Haley et al. [9] do,
because we assume that the provider can be trusted to satisfy
its own control requirements.
X. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper is based on two ideas: (1) Confidentiality
requirements specification cannot be based on incidents, but
must be based on an assessment of the risk of disclosure
of confidential information; (2) Requirements specification
in an outsourcing relation is budget-constrained. It is not
feasible to simply list all confidentiality requirements of
the client in an SLA with the provider: The outsourcing
relation would then become too expensive, and possibly the
provider cannot even satisfy all requirements because it has
also to satisfy other, possibly conflicting requirements. So
the client and provider must negotiate about the confiden-
tiality requirements to be included in the SLA, based on
a risk assessment of the most critical components of the
outsourcing infrastructure.
Our case studies and analysis so far indicates that
CRAC++ can satisfy our criteria (C1-C6), but satisfaction
of some criteria such as ease of use and repeatability need
further research. Currently, CRAC++ has been applied using
a series of linked spreadsheets. To allow testing usability
and repeatability, future work will include the development
of tool support for CRAC++.
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